The Guerrilla Warfare

 Those seeking historical insights into counterinsurgency warfare will find Roger Trinquier’s classic modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency disturbingly current. First published in 1961 and one of the best-selling post-World War II books in France, Trinquier influenced a generation of counterinsurgency scholarship. He succeeded in describing the true face of what current observers also label “modern war.”

Nearly 40 years later, for example, Mark Bowden subtitled his bestsellerBlack Hawk Down, the story of a US Special Forces operation in Somalia gone awry, A Story ofModern War. Despite important differences between Somalia and the colonial independence conflicts Trinquier participated in, ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq reflect many of the nonlinear, unconventional elements of what Trinquier labeled modern war to distinguish between armored battles between nation-states and counterinsurgencies pitting nation-builders against organizations using terrorist tactics.

Trinquier was introduced to counterinsurgency warfare in  Indo-china before being assigned to Algeria in 1957 as a Lieutenant Colonel with the  French  10th  Parachute  Division.  Decades of service conditioned his views. Algeria inspired his writings on modern war, including a penetrating testimony to the central tenet of counterinsurgency: winning the allegiance of the indigenous population. A systematic approach is needed.

Counterinsur-gencies require “an interlocking system of actions political, economic, psychological, the military that aims at the [insurgents’ intended] overthrow of the established authority in a country and its replacement by another regime.” As a military theory, Trinquier’s “modern war” parallels a prominent theme in post-Cold War military thought, one documented by Israeli military historian  Martin  Van  Creveld’s  1991  book, The  Transformation of  War.

Trinquier preceded Van Creveld and other post-Cold War military theorists in arguing that nuclear weapons would lead to a decline in traditional armored warfare and a rise in modern warfare in its many variants: guerrilla warfare, insurgency, terrorism, and subversion.

As do currently military analysts, Trinquierapproached the problem of countering modern warfare by assessing differences between linear clashes of armies and the tactics, goals, methods, and norms of the insurgent or guerrilla. Pitting a traditional combined armed force trained and equipped to defeat similar military organizations against insurgents “reminds one of a pile driver attempting to crush a fly, indefatigably persisting in repeating its efforts.”

In Indochina, for For example, the French “tried to drive the Vietminhinto a classic pitched battle, the only kind knew how to fight, in hope that superiority in material would allow an easy victory.” The only way to avoid similar pitfalls, according to Trinquier is to fight the “specially adapted organization” that is common to almost all subversive, violent movements seeking to overthrow the status quo.

In October 2003 it appeared the UnitedStates was creating its special organization to combat Iraqi insurgents: Task Force 121, a new joint strike unit reportedly composed of American special Forces units and Army Rangers.7Presumably steeped in counterinsurgency warfare, Task Force 121and other units operating against The Iraqi resistance has learned the lessons of past modern wars. They will not simply sweep towns.

This won’t defeat an organized insurgency. Instead, the enemy’s organization must be targeted to de-feat the clandestine organization attempting to impose its will on the Iraqi people. Four elements typically encompass an insurgency: cell networks that maintain secrecy; terror used to foster insecurity among the population and drive them to the movement for protection; multifaceted attempts to cultivate support in the general population, often by undermining the new regime; and attacks against the government.

Only by identifying and destroying the infrastructure of the subversive organization can the fledgling government perseveres. Stated another way, just as the traditional war is not fought with the individual soldier or platoon in mind but rather the state’s capacity and will continue hostilities, modern war seeks to destroy the organization as a whole and not simply its violent arm or peripheral organs.

After comparing the relative resources of the insurgent and government forces, Trinquier concludes “that the guerrilla’s greatest advantages are his perfect knowledge of an area (which he has chosen) and its potential and the support gave him by the inhabitants.” To turn this defeat into a victory, the counterinsurgent must recognize that “this total dependence upon terrain and population is also the guerrilla’s weak point.”

Toward this end, he suggests three simple principles: separate the guerrilla from the population that supports him; occupy the zones that the guerrillas previously operated from, making them dangerous for him and turning the people against the guerrilla movement; and coordinate actions over a wide area and for a long enough time that the guerrilla is denied access to the population centers that could support him.

This requires an extremely capable intelligence infrastructure endowed with human sources and deep cultural knowledge.  Indeed,  intelligence is key. As the Commander of the US Army’s 1st Armored Division in Iraq, Major General Martin Dempsey, observed in November 2003, “Fundamentally, here in Baghdad we do two things: We’re either fighting for intelligence or we’re fighting based on that intelligence.”

Despite unparalleled improvements in military intelligence, the United States does not seem to have the depth and breadth required in human intelligence (humint) and cultural intelligence arenas. Arabic linguists are lacking. Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Stephen Cambone, discussing intelligence shortcomings documented in an internal report, might have understated the problem, admitting, “We’re a little short on the humint side; there’s no denying it.”

For Trinquier, intelligence was one of several crucial enablers for de-feating an insurgent. Others included a secure area to operate from, sources in the general population and government, maintaining the initiative, and careful management of propaganda.

A critical step in any counterinsurgency campaign is the creation of a“tight organization” to counter the enemy’s organizational advantages. Created from the bottom up, based on a full appreciation for the tactical situation, a successful counterinsurgency organization must depart from their standard operational approach to warfare.

For example, campaign planning should include a system to account for every citizen, coordination with the political ef-fort to designate a hierarchical network of groups headed by pro-government chiefs, and a system to monitor the activities of guerrilla sympathizers. This entails a census, the issuing of photo-identification cards, and a countrywide intelligence system. The ultimate goal is to separate the fish from the sea, leaving it exposed to the state’s spear.